For years Panathinaikos has found it very easy to “sink” into introversion from one moment to the next. At any time and “for no reason whatsoever”. Especially when it comes to three consecutive – and extremely painful – losses in the championship in an 8-day period. The refereeing and all the series that have been made at the expense of Panathinaikos in recent weeks is a very serious problem in which his property must find a solution.

On the pitch, however, the responsibility is just as great, resting on both Ivan Jovanovic and the squad’s players for the few mistakes and weaknesses recorded over the past month. A lot has been written and said since Sunday evening (06/02), after the third loss in a row in Toumba, but the goal is to get everything on the right footing and distribute the responsibilities correctly.

Panathinaikos went to Thessaloniki with a “shit” absence of key and especially key players, especially in the axis of his midfield (vigiafanies punished, Mauricio injured). ‘Lack’ of options on the bench with dire straits in terms of midfield structure as two of the three key players who equalize the entire squad were missing.

The original plan worked well

Despite this, Toumba’s original plan worked fairly to very well. The first goal and the logic of ‘beating’ the Vierinias side with Palacios was correct because, apart from the Argentine goal, ‘Toukou’ caused constant problems in the first half with (and) Zivkovic’s inability to defend PAOK from that wing to cover its leader defensively. At the same time, there was balance in midfield, Panathinaikos easily “swallowed” all the pressure from PAOK, keeping the ball and North’s biceps out of his area.

The exit of Ludqvist

The first big problem was Ramon Ludqvist’s injury (meniscus tear). And as much as he didn’t… the image of the Swede filled the eye, his presence up to that point was valuable as he was Ruben’s ‘cushion’ in the movement of the ball and was the intermediary who ‘broke ” his pressure. PAOK. Jovanovic, knowing that Gacinovic is not yet able to play ball for an hour, was forced to put Vital, who was so slowly getting used to such a role from that point on, on the axis, and then the balance began to deteriorate.

PAOK started gaining possession from the last ten minutes, not from the second half. Only the picture of the game changed even more dramatically when the hosts began to fill their own axis and wings with “fresh” legs (Biseswar, Mitritsa) and now Panathinaikos “collapsed” floating 30-35 meters outside its range. after (and) the injury-related departure of Sotiris Alexandropoulos. The second big “Guinee” in the flow of the game, as a team that hasn’t had enough of everything in recent weeks has to face their bad luck every time…

The wrong choice with Ayub

With 4 of Panathinaikos’ 5 midfielders out of the game, the three main ‘objections’ and questions regarding management come from Ivan Jovanovic: 1) Why did he use the ‘forgotten’ out of nowhere? Yassin Ayub. 2) Why he decided to change the plan by passing Palasios for a (important) quarter at the front of the attack. 3) Why didn’t he make up his mind or try again to “finish” the match with a third stopper. There are ‘answers’ to everything, which in no way justified the Serbian coach’s decisions:

1) Jovanovic is a coach who can’t easily change his core principles and the way he wants to approach games from a core philosophy and what he’s been working on with his side from day one. Not only at Panathinaikos, it worked like that everywhere… He followed his ‘beliefs’ and doesn’t like to make big changes in the game structure of his team. That’s why, when Alexandropoulos was knocked out in the flow of the game, he decided to use the only central midfielder he had on the bench, even if he was… Ayub, so as not to disrupt the central idea of ​​​the game plan.

In any case, he wasn’t eligible, simply because the Moroccan… is a former player who is 290 days away from official first-team matches without a rhythm (he has only played three games with Panathinaikos B’) and was a perennial favorite. black hole” in limbo. , creating… a runway in midfield, larger than those in “Eleftherios Venizelos”. A move of desperation? But no doubt also a great risk that cost the defensive balance of the whole team.

He brought PAOK’s stopper higher

2) Choosing Palacios at the forefront of attack had to do with how the game was “playing” at the time. Panathinaikos had taken a (permanent) defensive position and the only case to ‘disrupt’ PAOK’s defensive line was to come up with something against the quick and flexible Argentine. However, in order for the ball to reach “Toukou” (who was already losing strength), someone had to be in between to give it… right. Ruben was trapped, chasing everyone left and right and Gacinovic trying to find his footing while the match ‘burned’.

Worst of all, with Palacios in the lead, the two PAOK stoppers no longer felt threatened as they had no player in front who could keep them busy by playing towards the ball with their backs in the minimal sockets of the defender , the third of them and now steadily rose above the center line. And by turns they began to catch … a stand in the Panathinaikos area. One, two, three, in the… fourth, Ingason made it 1-1 in 77′ and the psychology of Panathinaikos “sunk” even more.

No training with three stoppers

3) The constant question for the last few weeks has to do with the “why” he didn’t decide to put a third stopper towards the finals. In fact, from the moment that Panathinaikos already “burned” once, twice and three times in the last minutes of its matches, losing results and points that it had in its hands. The first “answer” has its “root” in the “core philosophy” that Jovanovic doesn’t want to change so easily, which was analyzed a bit above. And since the start of the season, there hasn’t been any work done on a three-stop device in training. He didn’t choose it this time either, although the conditions that had formed on the pitch at the time “screamed” that it was necessary… And in this game he’s generally not the most “flexible” coach.

Bringing in a third stopper in the last few minutes does not mean that you are “inviting” the opponent into your area, nor is the team “burdened” with uncertainty. Even more so, since possession is long gone, the opponent is attacking in waves and the defense is deep in his area.

The Serbian coach didn’t go for it this time either, but the results and everything that has been done – especially in the games with OFI and PAOK – shows that maybe he should take it much more seriously. Especially in those matches where Panathinaikos has the desired result until the last quarter.